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COURT OF APPEAL o
October 5, 1988

Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
re: Kathleen Hamby and
the State of Utah v. Gail
Jacobson, No. 880026-A
Dear Ms. Noonan:
To my letter dated October 4, 1988, should be added the
portion of the transcript at A-9 in the Respondent's brief. At
oral argument there was discussion of the posture of the positions
in the lower court.
"Mr. Taylor...his conduct is not such as would in any way be so
unreasonable or outlandish that would require the Court in the
interest of the children to take his name from them.11
Enclosed are five copies of this letter which I, by this letter,
certify that I am sending to all counsel in the case.
Thank you again.
Sincerely,

Priscilla
cc: Kathleen Hamby
Corporon and Williams
Ray Gamon
Lynn Wardle
Richard Taylor
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Lynn D. Wardle, Esq.

1976 N. 85 W.
Orem, UT

84057

801/225-9430
Mary T. Noonan
Clerk of Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
23 0 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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October 10, 1988
COURT OF APPEALS

Re: Hamby v. Jacobson, No. 880026-A
Dear Ms, Noonan:
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure I submit the following supplemental authorities.
1. Point Argued: The Record Shows That Counsel for Both
Parties Stipulated to Proceed on Proffers of Evidence.
"An informal conference was held in chambers between the Court
and counsel during which counsel stipulated to make proffers on
the record and submit memorandum in support of their respective
positions as this matter is mainly a matter of law." Minute
Entry, October 24, 1975 (R. 71).
2. Point In Brief: (Respondents Brief at 12) Despite
Appellant#s Attempts to Suggest Otherwise The Record Shows that
Mr. Jacobson Is Current In His Child Support Payments.
"MR. GAMMON: The mother has received some assistance from the
State of Utah in the past. The defendant or father has paid that
money to the State that was owing to the State. And so the State
then is simply to state that we have been paid for all assistance
that has been provided heretofore." Transcript of Trial, March
14, 1985 (R. 149)
3. Point in Argument: How Often Mr. Jacobson Has Visited His
Children (Or Been Violently and Abusively Prevented From Doing So
By Ms. Hamby) Since the Lower Court Entered Its Order.
Corbet v. Corbet, 472 P.2d 430, 431 (Utah 1970): "On appeal to
this court we review the judgments and orders appealed from on
the basis of the record upon which the trial court acted, and do
not permit the supplementation of our record with matters not
before the trial court."
Matter of Estate of Cluff, 587 P.2d 128 (Utah 1978): "However,
those matters are not part of the record before us, and in accord
with well-recognized rules of appellate review, we cannot
consider them in connection with this appeal."

Pvle v, McClure, 563 P.2d 809, 811 (Utah 1977): "Conceivably, it
could have changed the result, but it is not part of the record,
it was not submitted to the trial court, and we do not consider
it here,"
See also Chapman v. Chapmap, 728 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah 1986);
Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154 (1963).
4. Point in Argument: Whether Remand for Further Proceedings
Is Necessary.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5(3): "The court has continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care,
or the distribution of the property as is reasonable and
necessary."
Ruling, February 21, 1986: "Finally, the court notes that the law
provides that the children may petition for a name change if they
so desire when they are old enought to make an intelligent
decisions." (R. 103)
See also Hogue v. Hogue, 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
5. Point Briefed: Utah Does Not Authorize Joint Custody
(Petitionees Brief at 34) ; Point Argued: Utah Policy Re: Right
of Noncustodial Father to Maintain Relationship With Child
Following Divorce; This is a Type of Joint Custody.
In 1988 the Utah legislature amended Utah Code Annotated § 3 0-310.1 to -10.4f* (1988) to enact the following statutory joint
custody preference: XEROXED COPY ATTACHED,

Enclosed are five copies of this letter. I certify that I have
mailed^a^copy of this letter to: Richard Taylor, Priscilla Ruth
MacDougall, Corporon and Williams, and Ray Gammon.
Lncere
Lyrm D. Wardle
Counsel for Respondent

this chapter, "joint legal custody"
(1) means the sharing of the rights, privileges,
uties, and powers of a parent by both parents,
rhere specified;
(2) may include an award of exclusive authorby by the court to one parent to make specific
ecisions;
(3) does not affect the physical custody of the
hild except as specified in the order of joint legal
ustody;
(4) is not based on awarding equal or nearly
qual periods of physical custody of and access to
he child to each of the parents, as the best mterst of the child often requires that a primary
ihysical residence for the child be designated;
nd
(5) does not prohibit the court from specifying
ne parent as the primary caretaker and one
Lome as the primary residence of the child. 1988
10.2.

Joint legal custody order — Factors
for court determination — Public assistance.
There is a rebuttable presumption, subject to
action (2), that joint legal custody is in the best
»st of a child.
The court may order joint legal custody if it
mines that:
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal
istody;
(b) joint legal custody is in the best interest of
le child; and
(c) both parents appear capable of lmplementg joint legal custody
[n determining the best interest of a child, the
shall consider the following factors:
(a) whether the physical, psychological, and
notional needs and development of the child
ill benefit from joint legal custody;
(b) the ability of the parents to give first pnory to the welfare of the child and reach snared
jcisions in the child's best interest;
(c) whether each parent is capable of encourjmg and accepting a positive relationship beveen the child and the other parent;
(d) whether both parents participated in raisig the child before the filing of the suit;
(e) the geographical proximity of the homes of
te parents;
(f) if the child is 12 years of age or older, any
•eference of the child for or against joint legal
istody; and
(g) any other factors the court finds relevant.
The determination of the best interest of the
shall be by a preponderance of t h e evidence.
The court shall inform both parties t h a t a n orr joint custody may preclude eligibility for pubustance m the form of aid to families with dent children, and t h a t if public assistance is rei for t h e support of children of the parties a t any
ubsequent to a n order of joint legal custody, the
m a y be terminated under Section 30-3-10.4
The court may recommend t h a t where possible
urties a t t e m p t to settle future disputes by a disesoiution method belore seeking enforcement or
ication of the terms and conditions of the order
it legal custody through litigation, except in
ency situations requiring ex parte orders to
t t h e child.
1988

30-3-10.3.

T e r m s of joint legal c u s t o d y order.

(1) An order of joint legal custody shall provide
terms the court determines appropnate, which may
include specifying:
(a) either the county of residence of the child,
until altered by further order of the court, or the
custodian who has the sole legal right to determine the residence of the child;
(b) that the parents shall exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child, and where possible, confer before making decisions concerning any of these
areas;
(c) the rights and duties of each parent regarding the child's present and future physical care,
support, and education.
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the
child's attendance at school and other activities,
his daily routine, and his association with
friends, and
(e) as necessary the remaining parental rights,
privileges, duties, ana powers to be exercised by
the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly
(2) The court shall, where possible, include in the
order the terms agreed to between the parties
(3) Any parental rights not specifically addressed
by the court order may be exercised by the parent
having physical custody of the child the majonty of
the time.
(4) (a) The appointment of joint legal custodians
does not impair or limit the authontv of the court
to order support of the child, including payments
by one custodian to the other
(b) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is
not grounds for modifying a support order
(5) T h e agreement may contain a dispute resolution procedure t h e parties agree to use before seeking
enforcement or modification of t h e terms a n d conditions of t h e order of joint legal custody through litigation, except m emergency situations r e q u m n g ex
parte orders to protect the child.
1988
30-3-10.4. Modification o r termination of order.
(1) On the motion of one or both of the joint legal
custodians the court may, after a heanng, modify an
order that established joint legal custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or
both custodians have materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to be
modified, or the order has become unworkable or
inappropriate under existing circumstances, and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions
of the decree would be an improvement for and in
the best interest of the child
(2) (a) The order of joint legal custody is terminated upon the filing of a motion for termination
by
(l) both parents; or
(n) one parent, when notice of the motion
is sent by certified mail to the other parent
and an affidavit is filed with the motion, indicating the motion has been mailed as required by this subsection
(b) The order of joint legal custody shall be replaced by the court with an order of sole legal
custody unaer Section 30-3-10. All related issues,
including visitation and child support, shall also
be determined and ordered by the court
(3) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered frivolously and in a manner
designed to harass the other party, the court shall
assess attorney's fees as costs against the offending
partv
1988

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE COURT BELOW
1. Kathleen Jacobson.

The plaintiff who filed the Complaint

seeking a divorce in the district court was Kathleen Jacobson.
As a part of the relief granted by the district court, her
surname was changed from Jacobson to Hamby.

By stipulation of

the parties the title of this case on appeal has been changed to
reflect the fact that her surname now is Hamby.
2. Gail Jacobson.

The defendant below, Mr. Gail Jacobson,

was the husband of Kathleen Jacobson until the court below
granted the divorce decree sought by his wife.

Mr. Jacobson is

the father of two children by Kathleen, Kelly and Kevin.
3. State of Utah by and through Utah State Department of
Social Services.

Because Kathleen and the children had received

some assistance from the State of Utah for a period of time, the
State was joined as a plaintiff in the divorce suit below.
Because Mr. Jacobson had paid back the state for all the
assistance by the time of the divorce hearing, the State did not
seek, nor did the district court enter, any judgment against Mr.
Jacobson. (R. 149, Tr. 29.)

The State has no interest in this

appeal, has not filed any notice of appeal, has not participated
in the case on appeal, and is not a real party in the case the
appeal.
4. NB: Nonparties With Significant Interests.

The two

children of Ms. Hamby and Mr. Jacobson, Kelly and Kevin, were not
formal parties to the proceedings below, nor was any guardian ad
litem appointed to represent their interests.

Kelly was

approximately twenty-eight months old and Kevin was approximately

six months old when the hearing on petitions for name change was
held and the judgment was entered from which this appeal was
taken.
Mr. Hamby, the former spouse of Kathleen Hamby, may have some
practical, if not legal, interest in whether two children which
he did not father, which were born to his former wife several
years after their divorce, are given the surname Hamby.
not a party to the proceedings below.

(2)

He was
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court commit reversible error in

applying the "best interests of the child" standard to determine
what the legal surname of two infant children of divorcing
parents should be after the parents' divorce, and in rejecting
Appellant's claim that she, as the custodial parent, had the
unilateral right to determine the surname of the two infant
children of the parties?
2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in

determining that it would be in the best interests of the two
infant children of the parties to be known by the surname
Jacobson after their parents' divorce when the mother was awarded
custody of the children, the mother chose to be known after the
divorce by the surname of another former husband, Mr. Hamby, who
was the father of an older child in her custody who uses the
surname Hamby, and she wanted the two children of Mr. Jacobson
who would be in her custody also to be known by the surname
Hamby, but Mr. Jacobson wanted his children to bear the Jacobson
surname, he was awarded visitation rights and ordered to pay
support, the parties previously had agreed to change the birth
certificate of their oldest child, born out of wedlock, to
Jacobson, and the district court found, inter alia, that the
relationship between the noncustodial father and his children
would be strengthened by the children bearing the name Jacobson,
that the mother-child relationship would not be harmed if the
children had that surname, and that that the children would not

suffer embarrassment because of any alleged bad reputation
associated with the surname of their father?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & REGULATIONS
Constitutional Provision-United States
Amendment XIV, section 1
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Constitutional Provisions-Utah
Article I, section 2
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
Article I, section 7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Statutes
U.C.A. 30-3-5. Disposition of property-Maintenance and
health care of parties and children-Court to have continuing
jurisdiction—Custody and visitation-Termination of alimony.
(Pre-1985 version):
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance and health care of
the parties, as may be equitable. The court shall include in
every decree of divorce an order assigning responsibility for
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental
expenses of the dependent children. If coverage is available
at a reasonable cost, the court may also include an order
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health,
hospital, and dental care insurance for those children. The
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, and health and dental care,
or the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable
and necessary. Visitation rights of parents, grandparents,
and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare
of the child.

3

(As amended in 1985.):
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance and health care of
the parties and children, as may be equitable. The court
shall include in every decree of divorce an order assigning
responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary
medical and dental expenses of the dependent children. If
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the court may
also include an order requiring the purchase and maintenance
of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for those children. The court shall have continuing
jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance, and health and
dental care, or the distribution of the property as shall be
reasonable and necessary. Visitation rights of parents,
grandparents, and other relatives shall take into
consideration the welfare of the child.
U.C.A. 30-3-10.

Custody of children.

In any case of spearation of husband and wife having minor
children, or whenever a marriage is declared void or
dissolved the court shall make such order for the future care
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and
proper. In determining custody, the court shall consider the
best interests of the child and the past conduct and
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties. The
court may inquire of the children and take into consideration
the children's desires regarding the future custody; however,
such expressed desires shall not be controlling and the court
may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody
otherwise. . .
U.C.A. 42-1-1 to 3.

Chapter 1.

Change of Name.

U.C.A. 42-1-1. By petition to district court-Contents.
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may file a
petition therefor in the district court of the county where
he resides, setting forth:
1)
The cause for which the change of name is sought.
2)
The name proposed.
3)
That he has been a bona fide resident of the county for
the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
42-1-2.

Notice of hearing-Order of change.

The court shall order shay, if any, notice shall be given of
the hearing, and after the giving of such notice, if any, may
order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open
court of the allegations of the petition and that there
exists proper cause for granting the same.
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42-1-3.

Effect of proceedings.

Such proceedings shall in no manner affect any legal action
or proceeding then pending, or any right, title or interest
whatsoever.
Rules and Regulations
Guidelines for Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child
on the Birth Certificate (revised October 5, 1981) of the Bureau
of Health Statistics, Utah Department of Health.
Surname of Child.
The surname to be given the child should be determined by the
parents.
A.
When the mother is married it is usual for the child to
receive the surname of the husband (father). However, some
recent immigrants into the United States and some subcultures
within the nation have customs of assigning surnames which
vary from the standard American tradition. The surname given
the child should be determined by both parents. It clearly
is not mandatory that the child have the father's surname.
When the parents disagree as to the child's surname, the sole
consideration should be the best interests of the child.
THis may be best determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Therefore, if the parents (husband and wife) are in
disagreement regarding the surname of the child, it should be
left blank on the birth certificate. It can be added later
when the parents reach agreement by an affidavit to amend a
record or if necessary, by court order.
B. When the child's mother is not married, she has
considerable latitude in the name she gives the child. Even
if the father is not named on the birth certificate, the
mother may give the child a surname different than her own
surname. Additionally, the mother may name the father on the
birth certificate (by Acknowledgment of Paternity) and give
the child a surname different than the father's.
C. The parents should be advised that by giving the child a
different surname than that of the father, the birth
certificate may appear to some persons as a birth which
occurred out of wedlock.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, and
Disposition in the District Court,
The proceeding below commenced on or about October 29, 1984,
when Kathleen Jacobson (now known as Kathleen Hamby) filed a
complaint and an amended complaint seeking a divorce from her
husband, Gail Jacobson.

(R. 4 & 7.) The parties stipulated to

all matters except one: they could not agree what surname their
children (Kelly Lynn, who was born before they married, and Kevin
D., who was en ventra sa mere and would be born two days after
the divorce) would use after the divorce.
Tr. 2-3.)

(R. 31, 32 & 122-23,

The matter came before Judge Bullock of the Fourth

Judicial District for hearing on March 14, 1985.
Counsel for defendant moved for a continuance.

(R. 120.)
(R. 123, Tr. 3.)

Judge Bullock heard plaintiff's evidence (R. 125, Tr. 5), then
granted the divorce according to the stipulation, ordered that
Kelly would continue to have the surname Hamby "at this time"
(R. 116), ordered that the unborn child would take the surname
Jacobson when it was born, and ruled that the parties could apply
for name changes after the unborn child had been born, that
defendant could present evidence at that time, and the court
"would preserve the issues with respect to both until that time."
(R.149-52, Tr. 29-32.)
A divorce decree was entered on or about April 11, 1985.

(R.

114.)
After the birth of their second child, both parties filed
petitions to have the court change the surnames of the children:
the mother wanting them both to bear the "Hamby" surname, and the
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father wanting them both to bear the "Jacobson" surname.

(R. 37

& 39. )
The matter was heard on October 24, 1985, before Judge
Harding, to whom the case was assigned following the retirement
of Judge Bullock.
evidence. (R.

Counsel for both parties made proffers of
, 2d Tr. 1-8.)

After the parties submitted

memoranda on the legal issue, the district court entered its
Ruling noting many factors which it was taking into account and
finding "that it is in the best interest of the parties minor
children, Kelly Lynn and Kevin D., to be known by the surname
Jacobson."
10, 1986.

(R. 102.)

An Order to that effect was entered March

(R. 104.)

On or about April 7, 1986, Ms. Hamby filed a Notice of Appeal
from that Order.

(R. 109.)

B.
Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented
for Review.
The critical facts in this case are essentially undisputed.
(R. 75, 102, Tr. 2, 6.)

Mr. Gail Jacobson and Ms. Kathleen Hamby

married each other on or about November 29, 1983.
had been married previously.

(R. 75.)

Each

Kathleen had been married to a Mr.

Hamby, and had a child by him which she was raising.

After her

divorce from Mr. Hamby, Kathleen continued to be known by the
surname Hamby.

1

So did her child.

The transcript of this hearing was inadvertently omitted by
Appellant from the Record. Counsel for the parties have
stipulated, pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(h)
that it be included in the record and on the Index of Record.
As yet that has not been accomplished. References to this
short transcript are indicated herein by "R.
, 2d Tr.#." A
copy of this transcript is included in the Addendum.
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After her divorce from Mr. Hamby, Ms, Hamby became pregnant
with a child by Mr. Jacobson.

The child was born on or about

June 14, 1983 out of wedlock, and Ms. Hamby named him Kelly Lynn
Hamby on his birth certificate.

(R. 75-76.)

("He was born out

of wedlock and I gave him the name that I carried then."
127.)

R.

The parties agree that Gail Jacobson is the father of and

has acknowledged paternity of Kelly Lynn Hamby.

(R. 75-76, 139,

, Tr. 19, 2dTr. 4.)
Approximately five months after the birth of Kelly the
parties married each other.

(R. 75.)

Kathleen assumed the Jacobson surname.

During their marriage,
(She sued for divorce as

Kathleen Jacobson and testified that she wished to resume the use
of the name Hamby, by which she had been known prior to the
marriage to Mr. Jacobson.

R. 5, 126, 127; see also Affidavit In

Support of Motion for Change of Title of Action.)

(Defendant's

counsel proffered evidence that during their marriage the oldest
child of the parties, Kelly, like his mother, also was known by
the surname Jacobson, but this is disputed.

R.

, 2d Tr. 5 ) .

After their marriage, the parties agreed to change Kelly's
surname to Jacobson, and Kathleen got the necessary forms and
filled them out, leaving nothing to be done except to have them
notarized.

(R. 128, Tr. 8.)

Ms. Hamby's counsel summarized it

this way: "She would testify that some time after her marriage to
Mr. Jacobson they did enter into an agreement to change the
second child's name from Hamby to Jacobson, but that as far as I
can ascertain that was never followed through with on the records
of the State of Utah as far as an actual change being made in the
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birth certificate."

(R.

, 2d Tr. 3,)

Even though she was wary

of her husband's motives for insisting on that Kelly bear his
surname, she "still felt that for my child's sake it was the
thing to do and I went ahead and signed them, but I didn't send
them into the State because I was too confused as to whether I
should give him that kind of a right to a child that he had been
abusive towards ...."

(R. 128, Tr. 8.)

She agreed with her

husband, Gail Jacobson, "to put his name on the birth certificate
of the born child and have the unborn child when its born. . . .
I feel that they should have their father's name on the birth
certificate.

That's for the children's sake."

R. 132, Tr. 12.)

During the marriage of the parties to each other, Kathleen
became pregnant with their second child.

She was pregnant when

she filed her complaint for divorce, and was due to deliver in
just four weeks when the divorce hearing was held on March 14,
1985.

(R. 132, Tr. 12.)

By stipulation, the parties agreed that after the divorce,
Kathleen could resume using the surname of her previous husband,
Hamby.

They agreed that she would have custody of the children,

and that Mr. Jacobson would have reasonable visitation rights
with his two children.

(R. 32.)

They also agreed that for the

health of the mother the divorce should become final upon entry
(R. 136, Tr. 16). The court granted the divorce as stipulated by
the parties.

(R. 149. Tr. 29; R. 114.)

At the divorce hearing, the only dispute concerned the name
by which the two children of the parties would be known after the
divorce.

Kathleen wanted the two children to be known after the
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divorce by the name she had chosen for herself, Hamby (the name
of her former husband); Mr. Jacobson wanted his children to be
known by his surname, Jacobson.

(R. 32.)

Kathleen testified as

to the reasons why she wanted their children to have the Hamby
surname.

She had custody of a ten year-old son from her former

marriage, who had the surname Hamby.

(R. 127, Tr„ 7.)

She was

concerned that:
If the children donft have the same last name in the family I
feel that it makes more insecurity, less family closeness.
Mr. Jacobson has put me in a position now to raise three
children by myself, because it's his choice not to be a
husband I can stay with. And when I have to raise three
children I need the best circumstances to raise those kids
under that's possible; And I feel that having my whole family
have the same last name brings the family closer together,
there will be a lot less questions brought up at an earlier
date for those little babies. They won't be wondering why
their name is different until they are oldenough to discuss
it.
(R. 131, 32, T. 11, 12.

Emphasis added.)

She further testified

(notwithstanding her stipulation regarding visitation) that she
did not want Mr. Jacobson "to have any association with the child
at all" after the divorce.

(R. 140, Tr. 20.)

She alleged that

her husband "has always been known as a drinker and a fighter in
town."

(R. 133, Pr. 13.)

And she indicated that she believed

that she should have the right to choose the name of the children
because "I have custody of them, and I'm their mother."
Tr. 21.)

(R. 141,

But she agreed that "as the children get older, if they

make the decision that they want their father's name, if he has
been coming around and seeing them and being a father to them, I
would never object to my children having their way when they are
old enough to make a decision like that."
21. )
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"against the advice of

Mr. Jacobson was unavailable to testify at the divorce
hearing because, as his attorney advised the court, he was an
unemployed miner who recently had a chance to go out of state for
a few days work.

("He's been unemployed all winter, and told me

that if he passed this opportunity up he'd go to the bottom of
the board, something to do with the union"

R. 123-24, Tr. 3-4.)

His attorney had requested that the hearing be continued.

After

allowing the plaintiff to present her evidence, the court entered
an order essentially "preserv[ing] the issues with respect to
both [children] until" after the birth of the second child, and
allowing Mr. Jacobson to present testimony then.
32.)

(R. 152, Tr.

Thus, the court ruled that the oldest child would bear the

surname Hamby, and the next child should be named Jacobson, for
the time being.
At the divorce hearing Mr. Gammon, an attorney representing
the State of Utah, appeared and advised the court that Mr.
Jacobson had paid back the State all the money that was owing as
a result of some assistance the State had provided Mrs. Jacobson
in the past.

(R. 149, Tr. 29.) 2

On April 13, 1985, two days after the Divorce Decree was
entered, the second child of the parties was born.

(R. 76, 77.)

Pursuant to the Divorce Decree, the child was given the surname
of Jacobson.
Jacobson.

2

(Ij3.) The full name of this child is Kevin D.

(Id.)

The implication in Appellant's Brief that Mr. Jacobson was
garnished because he failed to pay child support is
misleading. The garnishment was to collect the judgment of
$252 for his ex-wife's attorney's fee. (R. 50, 115.)
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of

The court bases this ruling on the following reasons: 1) the
father-child relationship will be strengthened by the
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the
mother-child relationship, 2) there is no embarrassment [sic]
or inconvenience associated with an explanation of why their
mother's surname is different since divorce is a common
occurrence, 3) the children are too young to be accustomed to
the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is not the mother's maiden name,
5) there is no embarrassment because of defendant's alleged
bad reputation, and 6) the children will always be identified
with at least one natural, parent by being known as Jacobson.
. . . Of paramount concern to the court is the fact that
Kevin and Kelly should both bear the same name to avoid any
implication of illegitimacy which might arise if asked why
brothers of the same natural father have different last
names.
Finally, the court notes that the law provides that the
children may petition for a name change if they so desire
when they are old enough to make an intelligent decision.
(Id.)

On March 10, 1986, the district court entered its Order

that the infant children of the parties, Kevin D. and Kelly,
should both bear the surname Jacobson.
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and assiduously focused upon factors pertaining to the welfare of
the two minor infants of the parties.

The court properly

resisted attempts by the appellant to decide the controversy from
the perspective of the wishes or welfare of the contending
adults.
Procedurally, there is no question that the district court
had jurisdiction, incidental to and in connection with the
divorce of the parties, to resolve the dispute concerning the
surname of thier infant children.
Ms. Hamby's evidence was presented,

At the divorce hearing, after
the district court properly

delayed ruling on the issue, giving the parties a chance to reach
an agreement themselves, and reserving Mr. Jacobsonfs right later
to introduce evidence.

Later the court properly received

proffers of evidence (by stipulation of the parties), and asked
for memoranda on the legal issues.

After receiving those

memoranda, the district court entered a fair and just Order.
Since the district court did not abuse its discretion or enter a
flagrantly unjust order, the Supreme Court of Utah should not
substitute its judgment for that of the trial court, but should
affirm the Order of the district court.
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ARGUMENT
What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.
Wi 11 iam Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, 1.1 I 1 1
Good name ii l man and woman, dear my lord
Is the immediate j ewe 1 o£ their sou1s ;
W! u : • steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothi ng,
But he that filches from me my good name
Robs me of that wh:i ch not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed,
K i x ^ ^ . Shakespeare, Othello, III, i i 1, 1 5 5 .
I hate the man who builds his name
On ruins of another's fame.
John Gay, Fablels pt , I "I he poet and the rose,"

(\l/l)

I.
The District Court Applied the Proper Legal Standard to
Resolve the Conflict Between the Divorcing Parties Concerning the
Surname Their Children Should Have.
A.
A dispute between divorcing parents regarding the
surname their children will have after the divorce should be
resolved by the "best interests of the child" standard.
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:

consideration should be the best interests of the child.

This

may be best determined by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Numerous statutes specify that Utah courts are to follow the
"best interests of the child" standard in resolving conflicts
regarding the welfare of minor children.

See, e.g., U.C.A. § 30-

3-5 (in awarding visitation the court "shall take into
consideration the welfare of the child"); U.C.A. § 30-3-10 (in
determining custody and making related orders at the time of
divorce "the court shall consider the best interests of the
child"); U.C.A. § 78-3a-48 (juvenile court may approve voluntary
termination of parental rights if "in the best interests of the
parent and the child"); U.C.A. § 78-3a-39 (juvenile court may
enter all reasonable orders concerning a child in its
jurisdiction "which are for the best interests of the child");
U.C.A.§ 78-30-9 (adoption order will be granted only if the court
is "satisfied that the interests of the child will be promoted by
the adoption"); U.C.A. § 78-45c-3 (l)(b) & (d) ("best interests
of the child" is one factor in determining whether court may
exercise child custody jurisdiction); U.C.A. § 78-45c-7 (3)
(court should not exercise custody jurisdiction "if it is in the
interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction").
Likewise, numerous cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court
unequivocally established "best interests of the child" as the
legal standard for dissolving disputes regarding the custody and
care of minor children.

See, e.g., Hutchison v. Hutchison 649

P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982) "In a controversy over custody, the
paramount consideration is the best interests of the

18

«:

«:

ac_«E

i n t e r e s t s o : *•

* : i: *' i : '

m c d i f i *" a t *• *" ^ r

* . 3 *~ *

Vl

"j s t a n d a r d

"

r i::1

* r V - e r m i '" : n q

*' "*Q * a n *~ - -^

* t

- * ^v

-

* * ~ n 7 ~ if

BeckeL v . B e c k e 1
-* ~ -

* 1 * sv 1P "* ^ *

b e s " , n ** ? r 9 s t s "" r *• 1 • f-

-

a 1. p

*ar

d e t e r m i n e m o d I £ Ic a 1 1 o n o £ c i 1 s t o d y a £ t e r s 1 1 b s t a n t i a ] change o £
ci rci 1 nista rices ) ? L e m b a c h v. C o x , 693 P. 2d .] 9 1 (Ill a I'
d e t e r m i n e c u s t o d y o£ chi 1 d b01:1 1 o 111 0f • *di 1 c - best

"U

to

i n t e r e s t s of

t h e c h 11 d s t a n d a r d I s a p p ] i e • ii) ; s e e fur:: ri_e_r_ A n d e r soi 1 v , A n d e r s o n ,
1 ; 2 P 2 c 1 ] 3 2 (1 11 < 11 I! 9 16 ) ; • P e n n i n g t o n v. P e n n i n g t o n , ""LI P 2d 2 5 4
(Utah 1 9 8 5 ) ; T a y l o r v. W a d d o u p s , 241 P.2d
T h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t

legal

standard

15? (Utah

1952).

should be a p p l i e d to

L e s 111 v H . i 1 i in •»p u t. e I J e l w e e r 1 1,11 v 01 r e d 0 1 d J 7 0 r c 1 n g p a r e n t s
t h e s u r n a m e of t h e i r

c h i J d t e n hits b e e n d d d r e s s e d

states,, a n d in v i r t u a l l y

fie# *--r ?ii r. .

,=i

' I nd

1 *n

peuiuiLted U L Older - ! : *; 1 :" " *l
r n n s p n t . nf nnp nf

, a,

c ^ v r : H ;ro c o n s i d e r a t i o n ,

1 :

Noce

t

^

Idle rS2I:" r 2 : ': e r 3 ^

*

t

•

r> «-••* •
:..:•

* iinarilv a rnat^ 1 *
9 2

nam-

have

:

>.^- . : :»

: witnout

e

^ . ,; r: rr & u s u ^ l 1 .
•:

A n*•

<

;

r e c o g n i z e d that t T - *eifar-

: b , ;*=•

other

t I I O S P s t a t e s t he c o u r t s

HIP

.-

change

to m a n y

regarding

* •>
u- *:

•'* l«

.

;

"* •-

r •

leteiiuindtiun or trie
rnnrfc

;
\i.\

*.

J v _li 1 L r_i_; Il !i _!L:?*i;

1 r°

-< * "

iCi u s

? L

discretion.
:

- *

Fanu , 1 il

A u t o n o m y , E q u a l P r o t e c t i o n and the C h i l d f s B e s t I n t e r e s t s

- )

U t a h L, R e v , 3 0 3 , 32 3 ( h e r e i n a f t e r cited as " N o t e " )
g e n e r a l l y L a k s v_. JJ a k s , 2 5 h 1 :l z

19

P pp

58

5 10 P 2• ::1 1 2 7
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(1975) ("The persons who have the paramount interest are the
children and their best interests are controlling."); In re
Marriage of Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640,

169 Cal Rptr. 918, 620

P.2d 579, 583 (1980) ("Henceforth, as in parental custody
disputes, the sole consideration when parents contest a surname
should be the child's best interests."); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309
N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 1981) ("the best interest must govern the
resolution of the parents' quarrel"); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d
298, 300 (Minn. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) ("the
best interests of the child controlled the resolution of the
issue"); Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 91 (Mont. 1983) ("the
change of name and whether it was in the best interest of the
child"); Firman v. Firman, 610 P.2d 178, 181 (Mont. 1980) ("Since
there is no other statute in point, the Court must fall back on
general principles, the most important of which in any proceeding
concerning the relationship of a father and his child is the best
interests of the child."); Cohee v. Cohee, 317 N.W.2d 381, 384
(Neb. 1982) ("the standard to be used in the accomplishment of
this task is the best interests of the child, the same standard
used in all cases involving custody and visitation of minor
children"); Cohen v. Cunningham, 480 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (App. Div.
1984) ("neither parent has a superior right to determine the
surname of the child, and the question always is whether the best
interests of the child will be served by the change."); Hurta v.
Hurta, 605 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Wash. App. 1979) ("there is nothing
in the record to show that the proposal was considered from the
standpoint of the child, and it is the
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name by which a child will be known after divorce over the
objection of the other parent.

And despite enormous straining,

she has been unable to cite any court anywhere which has adopted
that position.

The leading authority cited for her proposition

is a concurring opinion of one justice stating what he thought
the rule should be in a case in which the California Supreme
Court expressly adopted another rule—the best interests of the
child standard.

In re Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583, 585 (majority

rule and Justice Mosk's concurring opinion).

The overwhelming

weight of authority rejects the custodial parent rule.

"Giving

the choice [of surname for children] to the custodial parent has
generally been rejected by the courts."
at 328 n. 113.

Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev.

Counsel for Appellant has acknowledged that

"Appellate courts have not expressly adopted the custodial parent
presumption, and one court to which it has been argued has
expressly rejected it."

MacDougall, The Right of Women to Name

Their Children, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91, 150 (1985) (hereinafter cited
as "MacDougall").

The Nebraska Supreme Court recently declare:

"We refuse to suggest or hold that a presumption exists in favor
of the custodial."

Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 384.

(But the court did

indicate that the name desired by the custodial parent was one
factor that should be considered.

Ijd. )

See also Young v. Young,

356 N.W.2d 823 (Ct. App. Minn. 1984); In re Schidlmeier, 496 A.2d
1249 (Pa. Super. 1985) (where the court "shied away from
expressly articulating the presumption" even though Pennsylvania
has an express regulation on the point.
Ineq. at 151 n. 242.)

MacDougall, 3 J.L. &

Apparently legislatures in two states have

adopted laws providing that the custodial parent has the right to
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It would be very poor policy for this court to adopt the
custodial parent rule or presumption urged by the Appellant.

The

rule would be contrary to the policy of this court against "fixed
rigidities11 in matters regarding the welfare of children.
Bingham v. Bingham, 575 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1978).

Moreover, the

custodial parent rule or presumption would create a significant
obstacle to parents voluntarily reaching agreements regarding
custody of their children.

Surely many parents who are willing

to stipulate that their ex-spouses should have primary custody of
their children would be reluctant to do so if the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that the custodial parent had the right, or
presumptive right, to select the name by which the children would
be known following the divorce.

The whole notion of giving one

parent the authority unilaterally to determine this matter is
unwise and arbitrary.

Indeed, if the court were to adopt an

arbitrary, unilateral rule, the better rule would be that adopted
by the majority of states which have adopted legislation on this
subject, i.e., that the noncustodial parent who is fulfilling his
responsibilities of support and association with the child ought
to have the primary role in determining the name by which the
children are known.

At least that arbitrary rule provides an

incentive for noncustodial parents to support and maintain
contact with their children.

It is indisputable that it is in

the best interest of the children of divorce to have a continuing
relationship with their noncustodial parent.

And while no court

can force a noncustodial parent to assume the responsibility
which he or she should exercise toward the children, the court
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should be extremely reluctant to block the reasonable efforts by
a noncustodial parent to maintain some tie (even a nominal tie)
with his or her children.

II.
The District Court Considered the Appropriate Factors in
Determining What Surname Would Be in the Best Interests of the
Children of These Parties.
A.
The Factors Considered by the District Court Have Been
Identified by This Court and Courts in Other States as the
Appropriate Factors in Determining the Best Interests of
Children.
The dispute in this case arose at the time of divorce.

The

divorcing woman wanted to resume using the surname of a former
husband, to whom she had been married some time before her
marriage to Mr. Jacobson and by whom she had one child who also
bore the surname "Hamby."

Mr. Jacobson did not object to his

wife resuming the use of the surname "Hamby."

However, she also

wanted the two minor children which she and Mr. Jacobson had
parented to bear the surname "Hamby."

Mr. Jacobson objected to

that, wanting them both to bear his surname, "Jacobson," after
the divorce.
In resolving this dispute between two parents regarding the
names by which their infant children would be known after the
divorce, the district court explicitly noted and considered nine
factors:

(1)

the relationship between the father (noncustodial

parent) and the children; (2)

the relationship between the

mother (custodial parent) and the children; (3)

the degree of

embarrassment or inconvenience the children would experience
having a surname different from that used by their mother; (4)
the very young age of the children and the length of time by
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which they had been known by their surnames; (5)

the fact that

the surname selected by the mother for them was not a family
(genealogical-biological family); (6)

any embarrassment that

would be associated with the use of the surname because of the
bad reputation of it; (7)

the stability of the identification

which the respective surnames represented; (8)

the implication

of illegitimacy which might arise from the use by biological
siblings of different surnames; and (9)

the fact that the

children when older may petition for a name change on their own.
The district court obviously had given careful consideration
to memoranda filed by the attorneys before making this decision.
The factors relied upon the district court are very similar to
the factors which the Utah Supreme Court identified in Hutchison
v. Hutchison as relevant to the determination of the best
interests of the child in custody disputes.

There the court

declared:
Some factors the court may consider in determining the
child's best interests relate primarily to the child's
feelings or special needs: the preference of the child;
keeping siblings together; the relative strength of the
child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians;
and, in appropriate cases, the general interest in continuing
previously determined custody arrangements where the child is
happy and well adjusted. Other factors relate primarily to
the prospective custodians' character or status or to their
capacity or willingness to function as parents: moral
character and emotional stability; duration and depth of
desire for custody; ability to provide personal rather than
surrogate care; significant impairment of ability to function
as a parent through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in the past;
religious compatibility with the child; kinship, including,
in extraordinary circumstances, stepparent status; and
financial condition. (These factors are not necessarily
listed in order of importance.)
649 P.2d at 41.
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The factors relied upon by the district court are also
similar to those endorsed by other courts which have stated that
disputes between divorcing parents concerning the surnames of
their children are to be governed by the best interests of the
child standard.

For instance, the California Supreme Court

declared:
Under the test thus revised the length of time that the child
has used a surname is to be considered. . . . If, as here,
the time is negligible because the child is very young, other
facts may be controlling. For instance, the effect of a name
change on preservation of the father-child relationship, the
strength of the mother-child relationship, and the
identification of the child as part of a family unit are all
pertinent. The symbolic role that a surname other than the
natural father's may play in easing relations with a new
family should be balanced against the importance of
maintaining the biological father-child relationship. ff[T]he
embarrassment or discomfort that a child may experience when
he bears a surname different from the rest of his family"
should be evaluated. . . .
In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583.

See also Cohee,

317 N.W.2d at 384; Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 329-30; Annot. 92
A.L.R. 3d at 192-93.
The district court's concern for the impact of the choice of
name upon the relationship between the child and the noncustodial
father was particularly appropriate.

In determining the best

interests of a child
courts look most frequently at the impact the change will
have on the father-child relationship. The starting point
for this analysis is the assumption that ff[s]ociety has a
strong interest in the preservation of the parental
relationship. Even though a divorce decree may terminate a
marriage, courts have traditionally tried to maintain and to
encourage continuing parental relationships." The courts'
concern is with the effect a name change will have on that
fragile relationship.
It has been recognized that change of a
surname may foster an unnatural barrier
and child and erode a relationship that
nurtured. . . . Where the parents of a
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child's paternal
between father
should be
child are

divorced and his mother has his custody, the bond
between father and child is tenuous at best, and that
bond may be weakened if not destroyed by a change of the
minor's name, . . .
It has been said that such a change
would lend aid to estrangement of father and child,
contrary to the best interest of the child, and
constitute a step toward complete severance of the
father-child relationship. . . .

. . . [A decree changing a child's name] approaches,
even though it does not reach, the permanent deprivation
attendant upon adoption. But the step from change of
surname, in view of its erosive effect on the parental
and filial relationship, may be a short one. Erosion
may be destructive, not just damaging.
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325, quoting Carroll v. Johnson, 565
S.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Ark. 1978); Accord, West v. Wright, 283 A.2d
401 (Md. 1971); Robinson v. Hansel, 223 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. 1974).
"It . . . has been generally recognized that the interests of
the [noncustodial] parent . . .

in maintaining a parental bond

with the child is entitled to significant consideration . . . ."
Annot. 92 A.L.R. 3d at 1095.

See also ^d. at 1106.

Many courts

have specifically noted this factor as a significant
consideration in their analysis of the best interests of the
child in change of name conflicts.

See, e.g., In re Marriage of

Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; In re Marriage of Omelson, 445 N.E.2d
951 (111. App. 1983); Burke v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. App.
1979); Firman v. Firman, 610 P.2d at 178; In re Newcomb, 472
N.E.2d 1142 (Ohio App. 1984); Ex Parte Stull, 280 S.E.2d 209
(S.C. 1981); Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d 61 (Ct. App. Tex.
1984).

The evidence in the record shows that Mr. Jacobson wanted

his children to bear his name; that the parties made an agreement
to that effect, and that he has consistently opposed the attempt
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by his ex-wife to call the children by the surname of her prior
husband, Hamby.

It also reflects that, despite the economic

frustrations of being an unemployed miner, he has done his best
to provide child support, and at the time of the divorce hearing
had paid back the state of Utah for all the sums it has provided
for his children and wife.
The district court appropriately considered the effect which
the surname of the children would have upon their relationship
with their custodial mother.

Utah courts have a profound

"commitment to stability and security and a child's custodial
placement."

Becker, 694 P.2d at 611.

However, it is worth

noting that courts have not emphasized this factor unduly
"because mothers, usually given custodial preference in the past,
generally had more regular contact and could maintain a
psychological relationship [with the children] without the need
for the tie

a surname provides."

620 P.2d at 584.

In re Marriage of Schiffman,

Nevertheless, it is a significant factor, and

Judge Harding appropriately took it into consideration in
determining the surname by which the children would be known
after the divorce of their parents in this case.
The silence of the record on this point, however, is
deafening.

There is absolutely no evidence that the mother-child

relationship would be harmed in any respect.
conclusion reached by the court.

And that was the

The mother had a child by a

previous marriage who went by the surname "Hamby."

During the

marriage of the parties, the mother went by the surname
"Jacobson."

Thus, during the time she was married to Mr.

29

Jacobson and lived with him, the mother had a different surname
than her oldest child.

There is no hint in the record that that

caused any harm to their relationship.

Moreover, the school

psychologist who testified, who was aware of the situation of the
parties, did not indicate that he was aware of any facts or
circumstances that would give rise to the suggestion that the
relationship between Ms. Hamby and her children would be harmed
if the children bore a surname different than the one she chose
to go by.

(R. at 144-49, Tr. 24-29.)

The misconduct of the noncustodial parent which might cause
the children to suffer the shame of "guilt by association" is a
valid factor to consider in determining the surname by which the
children should be known after divorce.
at 330.

In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d 1145.

Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev.
But, "[t]he misconduct

an ex-husband must engage in to forfeit his naming rights must be
heinous."

MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 139.

Thus, murder, In

re Christjohn, 428 A.2d 597 (Pa. Super. 1981), or incest and
incarceration, W.V.H., 246 A.2d 501 (N.J. Super. 1968) are the
types of conduct which could cause the children such great
embarrassment as to rule out the use of noncustodial father's
surname.

But the court will not reach that conclusion lightly,

or on the basis unilateral allegations of one divorcing parent
who is angry at the other.

"In In re Christjohn . . . the trial

court took extensive psychological testimony as to the damage the
murder did to the child."

MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 139, n.

187.
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In this case, the mother testified that the father of the
children "had a reputation as a drinker and a fighter" (R. 133,
Tr. 13) and she further alleged (without any corroboration) that
he had physically injured the child.

However, counsel for Mr,

Jacobson proffered evidence that "his conduct is not such as
would in any way be so unreasonable or outlandish that it would
require the Court in the interest of the children to take his
name from them."

(R.

; 2d Tr. 5.)

He further offered to

introduce evidence that the mother's "character and behavior is
negative."

(Ij3. )

Thus, this factor was not decisive.

The importance of the surname of the children to identify
them with their extended genealogical and biological family is a
relevant consideration.

"[C]ourts occasionally mention the

desirability of a child maintaining his paternal surname so that
he may know his parentage."

Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325.

See

also In re Presson, 451 N.E.2d at 970 (only son and only grandson
on father's side).

See also Brown v. Carroll, 683 S.W.2d at 63.

In this case, the name "Jacobson" links the children with one
of the two families from which they are descended, and of which
they are a part.

Jacobson is the genealogical and biological

paternal family.

On the other hand, "Hamby" links the children

with the family that is not a part of their biological or
genealogical heritage.
their mother.

It is the name of a former husband of

There was absolutely no evidence presented why it

would be in the best interests of the children to take the name
of their mother's former husband at the cost of losing any
identity-connection with both of the genealogical-biological
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families of which they are a part.

The isolation and

abandonment, the symbolic withdrawal from extended family, is not
to be discounted.
The court properly considered the age of the children and the
length of time they had been known by their surnames.

Certainly

continuity is an important factor in assessing the best interests
of very young children.
at 608.

Hogge, 649 P.2d at 51; Becker, 694 P.2d

The length of time a child has used a surname is a

factor that other courts and commentators have noted.

Note, 1979

Utah L. Rev. at 326, 327; MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 131; In
re Marriage Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583 ("If, as here, the time is
negligible because the child is very young, other factors may be
controlling."); Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 381.
In this case, the oldest child was less than 2 1/2 years old
at the time Judge Harding conducted the hearing on the cross
petitions for name change.

At the time of birth out of wedlock,

the child had been given the name Hamby, the name his mother was
then using.

Mr. Jacobson's counsel offered to present evidence

that during the marriage the child had been known by the surname
his mother used during the marriage, Jacobson.

(R.

5.)

The youngest

(Plaintiff would dispute that fact.

_Id. )

; 2d Tr.

child was less than six months old at the time of the hearing.
At birth he had been given the surname Jacobson.

Since it is

undisputed that the mother assumed the surname Jacobson during
her marriage to Mr. Jacobson, it is very likely that their oldest
child, an infant, was also known by the surname Jacobson.

But,

in any event, both children were so young that it is unlikely
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that either of them had any personal identification with the
surname that they were given.

Nor is it likely that their

friends identified them with that surname.

Thus, at the time the

district court entered its order on the cross petitions for
change of name, the age and length of time factors were
negligible.
Another factor which it was appropriate for the court to
consider was the degree of embarrassment or inconvenience which
the children would incur from having surnames that were
inconsistent from their mother's or other members of their own
family.

In re Marriage of Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; Cohee, 317

N.W.2d at 384.
Another factor the courts examine is the embarrassment,
confusion, and inconvenience a child may experience among his
peers because he bears a different surname than the rest of
his new family. This situation most commonly arises after a
child's parents divorce and his mother, the custodial parent,
remarries. The courts, however, almost uniformly recite the
litany 'minor embarrassment or emotional upset [is] not
sufficient to require that a change of name be granted' and
minimize the severity of the problem by pointing out that the
situation has become relatively common in a society where
divorce and subsequent remarriage are so prevalent.
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325-26.

See also Annot., 92 A.L.R. 3d

at 1100; MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 148.

Thus, most courts

have considered this factor, but have concluded that it is not
controlling in the absence of evidence of extraordinary
embarrassment, confusion or problem.

See generally, Laks, 540

P.2d at 1278; West v. Wright, 283 A.2d at 404; Young, 356 N.W.2d
at 823; Robinson, 223 N.W.2d at 141; In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d at
1142; Brown, 683 S.W.2d at 61; Flowers v. King, 237 S.E.2d 111,
114 (Va. 1977).
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In this case there was no evidence of any exceptional
circumstances.

There was no evidence that there had been any

problem, embarrassment, confusion or inconvenience for the 10
year old child of Mrs, Jacobson by her earlier marriage, named
"Hamby," while that child belonged to the "Jacobson11 family and
had a surname different from his mother, stepfather, and half
brother.

Moreover, Ms. Hamby has been known by three different

names during the past years.

She has been married twice, and

each time assumed the surname of her husband upon marriage.

If

she should marry a third time, there is no reason to believe that
she would not assume the surname of her third husband upon
marriage.

The inconvenience to the children of having a

different surname than their half-brother and mother might not be
as great as the embarassment of having a different surname than
either their father or mother, should Ms. Hamby remarry.
Lassiter-Geers v. Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 307 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1985).

It was appropriate for the district court to note

the potential instability of surname that would be created if it
acceeded to the Appellant's request that the children of Mr.
Jacobson should be given the surname "Hamby."
It was also appropriate for the court to consider the
significance of two children who were full brothers to one
another, born of the same mother and father, having different
surnames from each other.
to keep siblings together."

"We have also expressed a preference
Pennington v. Pennington, 711 P.2d

254, 256 (Utah 1985); Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41; Jorgensen v.
Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979).
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In this case, both the

mother and the father want their two children to bear the same
name as each other.

The only disagreement is to which name that

shall be.
It was appropriate for the district court to be concerned
about the stigma or embarrassment associated with illegitimacy
which the children might experience.

Because of the unique

circumstances associated with the religious practice of polygamy
by the early settlers of the territory, Utah has been the leading
jurisdiction in the United States to extend legal compassion and
concern for the welfare of "illegitimate" children.

(In Cope v.

Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891) the United States Supreme Court upheld
the Utah Territorial law giving illegitimate children the right
to inherit from their fathers, noting:

"While this statute is an

innovation upon the common law, and in some particulars a novelty
in legislation, we perceive no objection to its validity."
U.S. at 684.)

(137

U.C.A. § 78-30-12 today explicitly provides that

an illegitimate child may be adopted (legitimated) by its
biological father "by publicly acknowledging it as his own,
receiving it as such with the consent of his wife, if he is
married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were
a legitimate child. . . . "

And the most well-established method

of "acknowledging" an illegitimate child is for the father to
give the child his name.

See generally Slade v. Dennis, 594 P.2d

898 (Utah 1979); State Ex Rel Baby Girl M., 476 P.2d 1013 (Utah
1970); Rohwer v. District Court, 125 P.2d 671 (Utah 1912); See
also Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647 (1980).
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In the Guidelines for

Reporting Name of Father and Surname of Child on Birth
Certificate (revised Oct. 5, 1981) the Bureau of Health
Statistics, Utah Department of Health notes:

"The parents should

be advised that by giving the child a different surname than that
of the father, the birth certificate may appear to some persons
as a birth which occurred out of wedlock."

Thus, it was entirely

appropriate for the district court to take this factor into
account.
The district court properly considered the ability of the
children to change their own names when they become mature.
"Under the common law a person can change his surname without any
formal legal proceeding, so long as his purpose is not fraudulent
and the change does not infringe upon another's rights.

All

states, however, provide a statutory method for effecting a
change of name. . .

Most jurisdictions [interpret] the statutory

procedure as being supplemental to, and not supplanting the
common law."

Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 316, 317.

MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 104.

See also

This factor has been

considered by other courts in resolving disputes between parents
regarding the surnames of their children.

Firman, 610 P.2d at

181; Brown, 683 S.W.2d at 61; In re Newcomb, 472 N.E.2d at 1142;
In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 302.
Utah has a change of name statute which provides a clear and
easily accessible procedure for change of name.
2, 3.

U.C.A. § 42-1-1,

Since the children in this case were both under the age of

three, it was both prudent and appropriate for the district court
to take into account the fact that they would have the
opportunity (undoubtedly heavily influenced by their custodial
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mother) when they reached an age of discretion to initiate a
proceeding to change their surname if they wanted to do so.
it should be noted also that both parties in this case
expressly agreed that the children should bear the surname of Mr.
Jacobson.
3.)

(R. 31, 32, 40, 41, Tr. 11, 12, 20, 21; R.

; 2d Tr.

Unilateral action of a custodial mother to change the

surname of a child in derogation of an agreement ought not to be
endorsed by the court.

Gershowitz v. Gershowitz, 491 N.Y.S.2d

356 (App. Div. 1985).
B.
The District Court Properly Did Not Employ Any Genderbased Presumption in Resolving the Dispute Concerning the Surname
of the Children of These Divorcing Parents.
Judge Harding did not in any way rely upon any gender-based
presumption in resolving the dispute between these parents
concerning the surname their children should bear.

Neither his

Ruling nor his Order, nor the transcript of the hearing he held,
contains any hint or shadow of sex-bias.
The gender-neutral approach taken by the district court below
is exceptionally astute and progressive.

By contrast, the

highest courts in at least 15 jurisdictions, and appellate courts
in another 14 states "have accepted the standard that the father
has a 'primary' and a 'protectable' 'natural' or 'time-honored'
right superior to that of the mother to name his children."
MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 137.

See also Annot. 92 A.L.R. 3d

at 1105-06; Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev. at 323, 328.
The more enlightened, rational approach is that neither
parent has a superior right to name the child.

See, e.g., In re

Schiffman, 620 P.2d at 583; Cohee, 317 N.W.2d at 383; In re
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Saxton, 309 N.W.2d at 300; Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d at 304.
Note, 1979 Utah L. Rev- at 309-11, 15, 32-33,

See also

Although equal

protection challenges on the paternal surname custom have been
notably unsuccessful, MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. at 157, as a
matter of policy (wholly apart from constitutional law) a genderbased rule of parental preference in determining surnames of
children would provoke controversy not only in society, but would
encourage litigation among hostile divorcing parents.
Ironically, it is the Appellant, Kathleen Hamby, who is
urging the court to adopt a sex-based rule, or a thinly-disguised
gender preference.

Appellant's counsel contends for "the right

of women to name their children."

MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91.

That would violate equal protection because it would constitute
direct gender discrimination.

Note, Utah L. Rev. at 315.

The Appellant's assertion that custodial parents should be
given the right, or presumed right, to choose the surname of
their children is a thinly-disguised attempt at gender
discrimination.

It is a well-known fact that approximately 90

percent of all children living with just one parent are living
with their mothers.

Bureau of Census, Current Population Report,

Population Characteristics Services, P-20, No. 380, Marital
Status and Living Arrangements, March, 1982, at 4 (1983).

A

legal preference for custodial mothers would smell just as much
of sex discrimination as a legal presumption in favor of
noncustodial fathers.
The enlightened approach followed by Judge Harding, who
declined to adopt or apply a male or female favoring rule or
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presumtpion, should be commended and endorsed by the Utah Supreme
Court.

Indeed, this court should say, as the Montana Supreme

Court recently did:

"The District Court's findings and

conclusions state nothing to the effect that husband has any
preference or natural right to have his [children] bear his
surname.

The child's best interests does not involve the

equality of the sexes.

The findings and conclusions stress the

best interests of the child.
argument without merit."

Therefore we find the Appellant's

Overton v. Overton, 674 P.2d 1089, 1091

(Mont. 1983).
C.
This Court Should Not Substitute the Feminist
Perspective for the Best Interests of the Child.
Kathleen Hamby and her counsel in this case have missed the
crucial issue.

The issue in this case is not as Appellant's

counsel suggests, a matter of "The Right of Women to Name Their
Children."

MacDougall, 3 J.L. & Ineq. 91.

As noted above, that

"right" arguably violates the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution, and the Utah Constitution, as a rule of blatant sex
discrimination.
Determining the surname of children is not to be decided as a
matter of the mere extension of the rights of the adult parents.
The court is not merely an umpire awarding a prize to one of two
competing adults.

Children are not mere chattels to be possessed

by custodial mothers or abandoned by disinterested, noncustodial
fathers.
The record reveals a punitive motive on the part of
Appellant, Kathleen Hamby.

She testified:

"Mr. Jacobson has put

me in a position now to raise three children by myself, because
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it's his choice not to be a husband that I can stay with.
131, 32; Tr. 11, 12.)

(R.

(Ironically, while she blames Mr. Jacobson

for not being "a husband that I can stay with" it was Kathleen
Jacobson who filed the suit for divorce, not Mr. Gail Jacobson.)
She also expressed her opposition to Mr. Jacobson having any
association with the children at all after the divorce.
140; Tr. 19, 20.)

(R. 139,

(But see Ed. at 140, 141; Tr. 20, 21:

"as the

children get older, if they make the decision that they want
their father's name, if he has been coming around and seeing them
and being a father to them . . . .")

She also blamed her husband

for a physical injury which the oldest infant has.
8.)

(R. 138; Tr.

And she was very anxious to have the divorce entered

immediately, without any waiting period ("I'm

begging the court

to make the divorce final today so that I can have this baby.
I've suffered this pregnancy the whole time facing this divorce.
. . ." R. 136; Tr. 16.)
The demeanor of Mrs. Jacobson when she appeared before the
court at both hearings, is not captured by the record.

But if

her demeanor matched her words, she demonstrated substantial
hostility toward the father of the children, her ex-husband.

The

name she wanted to give the two children of Mr. Jacobson was the
surname of her former husband (against whom Mr. Jacobson compared
during his marriage to the Appellant).

It is also noteworthy

that when she divorced her former husband, she did not insist
upon changing the name of the child they had, whose custody was
awarded to her.

Since the surname by which a child should be
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known after his parents divorce ought not to be resolved on the
basis of spite, punishment, or animosity, the attitude and
statements of the Appellant detract from the weight and
credibility of her contention that the children should bear the
surname of her former husband, "Hamby."
Most of the cases involving a conflict between parents over
the surname of their children arise "after a child's parents
divorce and his mother, the custodial parent, remarries,"
1979 Utah L. Rev. at 325,

Note,

In this case, the controversy does not

arise upon remarriage, when the children arguably have been
integrated into a new family and another father-figure has
replaced their natural father.

The controversy arises because

the custodial mother wants to terminate and cut-off all ties
which the noncustodial father has with his children.
If the sole question were the best interests of Kathleen
Hamby, she might arguably persuade the court that the children
should bear her surname because she would be happier, avenged or
so forth.

But that is not the question the district court asked,

nor is it the question that this Supreme Court should consider.
Rather, the focus is on the best interests of the child.

And

that was the sole principle followed, and the controlling
principle applied, by the district court below.
Ill.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Ordering the Children of These Divorcing Parents to Take the
Surname "Jacobson."
A.
The District Court Had Jurisdiction to Determine in a
Divorce Proceeding the Surname by Which the Children of the
Divorcing Parents Would be Known After the Divorce.
U.C.A. § 30-3-5 provides that the district court may enter
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such orders in relation to the children . . .

as may be

equitable" at the time the district court entered the divorce
decree.

(At the time the District Court heard the subsequent

cross petitions regarding change of name this statute had been
amended, but this language remained unchanged.

See also U.C.A.

§ 30-3-10 ("The court shall make such order for the future care
and custody of the minor children as it may deem just and
proper.").

U.C.A. § 30-3-5 has been very liberally construed,

and grants continuing jurisdiction to the court.

See Karren v.

State Dept. of Social Services, 716 P.2d 810 (Utah 1986); Dehm v.
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976).

Other courts, likewise, have

held that it is proper for a court on divorce to retain
jurisdiction to later resolve a dispute regarding the surnames of
the children of the divorcing parties.

Lassiter-Geers v.

Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303, 305 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
The Appellant urges the court to hold that the lower court
had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute regarding the names of
the children.

Respondent agrees that the district court had

jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the lower court has never been

contested by anyone.

There is no jurisdictional issue for the

Supreme Court of Utah to decide.
B.
The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Entering Its Order in This Case.
Application of the best interests of the child standard in
any case regarding the welfare of children is most appropriate
for the trial court.

As this court recently stated concerning

application of the best interest of the child standard in custody
disputes:

"Assessments of the applicability and relative weight

of the various factors in a particular case lie within the
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discretion of the trial court,

'Only where trial court action is

so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abusive discretion
should the Appellant forum interpose its own judgment.'"
Hutchison, 649 P.2d at 41.

See also Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599

P.2d 510, 12 (Utah 1979); Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P.2d 1323 (Utah
1982); Christensen v. Christensen, 528 P.2d 1297 (1981).
Likewise, the court has declared:

"In reviewing child custody

and support proceedings, we accord substantial deference to the
trial court's findings and give it considerable latitude in
fashioning appropriate relief.

We will not disturb that court's

acts unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary
where there has been an abusive discretion."
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985).

Woodward v.

And this is the standard

generally applied in other states when an appeal is brought from
a decision resolving a dispute between parents regarding the
surname of a child.

See, e.g., Flowers, 237 S.E.2d 111, 113 (Va.

1977); In re Marriage of Presson, 451 N.E.2d 971, 72 (L. App.
1983) ("The standard applied in cases involving a minor child's
change of surname is whether, considering the welfare of the
child, the trial court abused its discretion in arriving at its
decision.").
The issue arose below on cross petitions incidental to the
divorce decree.

Kathleen Jacobson failed to offer sufficient

evidence to persuade the court that it would be in the best
interests of her children that they should bear the surname of
her prior husband, who was not the father of the children.
Before Judge Harding, both counsels stipulated to proceed on
profers of evidence.

(R. 102, 71,
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; 2d Tr. 2 ) .

The procedural approach followed by the lower court was
excellent.

At the time the divorce hearing came before Judge

Bullock, the only remaining disagreement between the parties was
what the children's surnames would be,

Mrs. Jacobson was anxious

to have the divorce become effective immediately, and Mr.
Jacobson was willing to accede to that wish.

The court entered

its order granting the divorce but preserving the status quo
regarding the names of the two minor children.

That gave the

parties an opportunity to work out their disagreement.

If they

could not, the court retained jurisdiction to resolve the issue
after Mrs. Jacobson delivered her child.

After the birth of the

child, both parties filed petitions regarding the change of
names.

At the hearing, the parties stipulated to introduce

profers of evidence.

The court then, without ruling, asked for

briefs on the legal question.

After those briefs were submitted

and the court carefully considered them, the District Court
entered its ruling applying the "best interests of the child"
standard and specifying numerous significant factors which it
took into account in this particular case.

The court promptly

entered its Order that the children should bear the surname
"Jacobson."
The district court found that there was no dispute as to any
material facts.

In this court, there does not appear to be any

dispute as to the facts either.

Appellant Kathleen Hamby failed

to introduce sufficient evidence to justify the unorthodox,
disruptive and potentially punitive selection of surnames upon
which she was insisting.
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CONCLUSION
The district court applied the correct legal standard to
resolve the controversy between two divorcing parents concerning
the surname which their two infant children would take after the
divorce by focusing on the best interests of the children.

The

district court properly rejected the appellant's contention that
the custodial parent has the right or presumptive right
unilaterally to choose the surname by which the two infant
children fathered by the man she is divorcing shall be known
after the divorce, over the objection of the father.
The district court properly rejected appellant's contention
that the two infant children should bear the surname of one of
her previous husbands, who was not the father of the children,
even though appellant herself chose to be called by that surname
after the divorce.

The district court's determination that the

children should bear the surname of their father, who desired the
children to bear his surname, and who was awarded visitation
rights, was correct inasmuch as the court properly determined
that it would strengthen the relationship between the children
and their noncustodial father, would not harm the relationship
between the children and their custodial mother, and would not
embarrass or humiliate the children to carry the surname of their
father because of any alleged bad reputation, would not cause
undue inconvenience to them, and would preserve their ties with
at least one of their biological-genealogical families.
Therefore, Respondent Gail Jacobson respectfully requests the
Utah Supreme Court to affirm the order of the district court to
award Respondent costs, and attorneys fees.
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Respectfully submitted this / / day of July, 1986.

f^JJ^JL^ °T\A

•%it
Lynn D. Wardle
Co-counsel for Respondent

Richard M. Taylor
Co-counsel for Respondeat

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. I certify that I mailed four copies of
the foregoing Respondent's Brief, U.S. postage prepaid, this [cj>
day of July, 1986, to counsel for Appellant:
MacDougall, 346 Kent Lane, Madison, WI

to Priscilla Ruth

53713 (2 copies), and to

Mary C. Corporon and Kellie F. Williams, Corporon & Williams,
1100 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 (2 copies).Cocounsel for Respondent, Lynn D. Wardle, 1976 N. 85 W.^^jOrem, UT
t ^ - ^ ^ U (XA \

84057 also retained two copies.
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ADDENDUM
1. Order of District Court, March 10, 1986, in Jacobson v.
Jacobson
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2. Ruling of District Court, Feb. 21, 1986, in Jacobson v.
Jacobson

A3

3. Transcript of Proceedings, Oct. 24, 1986, in Jacobson v,
Jacobson
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

7H
" KATHLEEN JACOBSON,
8 || AND THE STATE OF UTAH
by and through Utah State
9
II Dept. of Social Services,
10

Plaintiffs,
ORDER

11

vs.

12 || GAIL JACOBSON,
1

3||

Defendant.

Civil No. 67,957

14
This matter came on for hearing October 24, 1985 before
15
the Honorable Ray M. Harding upon plaintiff's petition to change
16
the surname of Kevin Jacobson to Kevin Hamby and upon defendant's
17
petition to change the surname of Kelly Hamby to Kelly Jacobson.
18
The Court heard profers of testimony from plaintiff and
19
defendant and counsel for the parties stipulated that the Court
20
may consider the petitions before it upon such profers and upor
21
memoranda

to be filed. The parties filed the memoranda and th<

22
Court having considered the same it is therefore
23
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as foLlows:
24
1.

Kevin

D.

Jacobson

25
-126
27

<U

born

April

13,

1984

shal

1 continue to bear the surname of defendant Gail Jacobson.
2
3
4

2.

Kelly

Hamby

born

June

14,

1983

shall

bear

the

surname of Jacobson
and snail
shal^l be
as Kelly
Jacobson.
m ana
De known
Known as
n^eiiy jac<
DATED thJ
lis .

o f / ^ S f e K ^ , 1986.
BY THE^GOURT:
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the foregoing to Mr. Donald E. Elkins, Attorney at Law, 60 East
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100 South No. 200, Provo, UT 84601, postage prepaid on the 28th
12

day of February, 1986.
13
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

KATHLEEN JACOBSON,

Case Number

67957

Plaintiffs,
vs.

RULING

GAIL JACOBSON,
Defendant.
********

Having considered the memoranda and argument of the
parties, and having taken the matter under advisement, the court
hereby grants defendant's petition and denies plaintiff's
petition.

The court finds that it is in the best interest of the

parties minor children, Kelly Lynn & Kevin D., to be known by the
surname Jacobson.
The court bases this ruling on the following reasons:
1) the father-child relationship will be strengthened by the
children bearing the name Jacobson while not harming the motherchild relationship, 2) i:here is no embarrassment or inconvenience
associated with an explanation of why their mother's surname is
different since divorce is a common occurrence, 3) the children
are too young to be accustomed to the surname Hamby, 4) Hamby is
not the mother's maiden name, 5) there is no embarrassment
because of defendant's alleged bad reputation, and 6) the
children will always be identified with at least one natural
parent by being known as Jacobson.
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The court finds unpersuasive plaintiff's arguments that
it would be beneficial for Kevin and Kelly to be known by Hamby
as their mother and stepsister are.

Were custody to change,

Kevin and Kelly would be faced with the same situation plaintiff
now seeks to avoid.

Furthermore, were plaintiff to remarry Kevin

and Kelly would again have a surname other than that of at least
one of their custodial parents.
court is the fact that Kevin

Of paramount concern to the

and Kelly should both bear the same

name to avoid any implications of illegitimacy which might arise
if asked why brothers of the same natural father have different
last names.
Finally, the court notes that the law provides that the
children may petition for a name change if they so desire when
they are old enough to make an intelligent decision.
Defendant's counsel to prepare an appropriate order.
DATED this ^ / ^ T day of Fefcfnl^f^

cc:

Richard M. Taylor
Donald E. Elkins
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P R O C E E D

1

I N G S

2
THE COURT:

3

Good morning, ladies and

This is the time set for the h earing in the

4

gentlemen.

5

case of Jacobson v. Jacobson, Civil No. 67 ,957.
The matter is before the Court on the plaintiff f s

6
7

petition.

The record may reflect that the Court has

8 1 conferred briefly with counsel in chambers prior to this
9

proceeding and the Court feels the best way to proceed

10

this morning would be by way of proffered statements of

11

factual evidence_which, I believe^ is essentially

12

undisputed and that the principal issue is a matter of

13

law that will require briefs by counsel to be submitted

14

and the Court make its determination based on those briefs.
Mr. Elkins?

15
16

MR. ELKINS:

Your Honor if the plaintiff,

17

my client Mrs. Kathy Hamby, were to testify this morning

18

she would testify the following facts:

19

the name she goes by now, is the name from a prior

20

marriage; that she has one older child who goes by that

21

name Hamby.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ELKINS:

24
25

What is the age of the child?
Kathy, how old is your oldest

child?
THE PLAINTIFF:

u

That Hamby,

Eleven.

1

the records of the State of Utah.

She would testify that

2

both those things were done; that in fact: the middle

3

child still maintains the-name of Hamby, while the third

4

child when it was born did have the name of Jacxihson

5

affixed to the birth certificate and that still remains

6

so on the records of the State of Utah.

7

testify that she feels as a custodial parent it's her

8

right to have the name of the children be as she desires

9

so that at least all her family would have the same name.

She would further

10

That will be one of the issues that we will be speaking

11

about in the briefs submitted.

12

that she feels that Mr. Jacobson, due to prior action on

13

his part, is^unfit to have his name attached to the child

14

and that were it attached to the younger child or the

15

second child that it might create problems for them which

16

would not be in their best interests, and that she would

17

finally testify that she thinks that having all of her

18

children bear the same name as she would be in their best

19

interests .and that that is what she would request of the

20

Court •

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. TAYLOR:

She would further testify

Very well then, Mr. Taylor?
Briefly, Your H onor, our

23

facts will essentially be the same as stated by Mr. Elkins

24

with 1the exception that the child —

25

about four years old, isn't it?

/17

I think the child is

1

MR. ELKINS:

He is eleven years old,

Your Honor.
She would further testify that she conceived
another child with Mr. Jacobson, the defendant in this
matter, prior to the time of their marriage; that when
that child was born the name Hamby was given to him on
his birth certificate.

Since that time he's been known

by the name of Hamby.

She would testify that some time

after her marriage to Mr. Jacobson they did enter into
an agreement to change the second child's name from Hamby
to Jacobson, but that as far as I can ascertain that was
never followed through with on the records of the State
of Utah as far as an actual change being made in the birth
certificate.

She would further testify that during the

time of her marriage to Mr. Jacobson another child was
conceived and that she brought a complaint for divorce
against Mr. Jacobson prior to the birth of that last child;
that she was granted a divorce in a hearing before Judge
Bullock in this Court; that as part of the divorce decree
the parties were told that the second child by the name
of Hamby, who is the natural child of Mr. Jacobson, was
instructed to maintain the name of Hamby, at least on a
temporary basis, and that the new child that was to be
born after the granting of the divorce was to have the
name of Jacobson affixed to his or her birth certificate on

3.

1

(Discussion off the record.)

2

The child is three years old, the oldest child.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR,. TAYLOR:

Two.
Only two.

5

infant.

6

the name and was known by the name of Jacobson during the

7

1*:time

There are those two.

Then we have an

The two year old did use

the parties lived together as a married couple

8

THE PLAINTIFF:

9

MR. TAYLOR:

10

THE COURT:

11

MR. TAYLOR:

That is not true.

That is our answer.
Well -We also, of course, would

12

dispute the legal conclusions as have been stated here

13

and we would also have evidence that the defendant, while

14

he wouldn't qualify for sainthood, nevertheless, his

15

conduct is not such as would in any way be so unreasonable

16

or outlandish that would require the Court in the interest

17

of the children to take his name from them.

18

were, even if his behavior were negative in some respects,

19

likewise the applicant's character and behavior is

20 I negative.

We won't want to get into that,

21 I Court indicated, that would not be an issue.

Even if it

I think the
So we would

22

submit it on that statement of our proffer that if he

23

were called to make evidence that is what our evidence

24

would be.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

Very well.

I

1

don't feel there is any material dispute as to the ij^sues

2

of fact in this case.

3

in chambers, it is a case in which I need your assistance

4

in the law.

5

appreciate, Mr. Elkins, since it's your petition that you

6

file a memorandum.

7

number of pages, Mr. Elkins, but I don't want a two hundred

8

page brief.

9

I would allow you over the five pages prescribed by the

10

However, as I indicated to counsel

I feel it is a legal issue and I would

I don't want to restrict you in the

If you could limit it to ten or fifteen pages.

rules.
How long do you need to complete that memorandum?

11

MR. ELKINS:

12

Your Honor, I think I can

13

have that prepared within fifteen days if that would be

14

appropriate.
THE COURT:

15

All right.

Let's have that

16

submitted to the Court within fifteen days and a copy to

17

Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor, how long would you like to have to

18
19
20

respond?
MR. TAYLOR:

I would like at least fifteen

21

days and also if the Court will allow me" that fifteen days

22

I would like approval from the Court now that in the event

23

that I need the extra time I can, by stipulation, obtain

24

it from Mr. Elkins without asking.

25

MR. ELKINS:

A

r

r«-

We have no objection to that.

6.

We would like to have the matter fully presented to the
Court.
THE COURT:

All right.

Fifteen days then

in which the defendant will have then to respond.

If

you need additional time you may have it upon stipulation
of Mr. Elkins.
MR. TAYLOR:

I have several major matters

in Federal Court that are coming up soon.

I am a little

concerned about my time.
THE COURT:
then.

All right.

That will be fine

That will be the order, gentlemen.
MR. ELKINS:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Likewise, Mr. Taylor, I will

not limit you in your length of response, although I would
like not over, say, ten or fifteen pages.

Let's keep it

within reasonable bounds.
Thank you.
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This is to certify that I, STANLEY C. ROUNDY, am

5

an Official Court Reporter in the State of Utah; that I

5

was present during the proceedings in the before-entitled

7

cause; that thereat I reported in shorthand the proceedings

3

and testimony given; that thereafter I dictated my notes

9 I so taken to a typist working under my direction who then
10

transcribed the same into typewriting; that said transcript

11

is set forth in the foregoing pages, numbered from 2 to 7,
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inclusive, and consitutes to the best of my ability a true
record of the proceedings had.
Dated this/£ day of
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